Abstract. A common feature practical reputation schemes is that they are on-line which results in restrictions to both availability and scalability. In order to overcome these two problems we propose an off-line reputation scheme based on public key certificates. We introduce the idea of articulated certificates which use proxy signatures to increase the efficiency of reputation verification. As well as being well-suited to our problem such linked certificates may be of independent interest.
Introduction
Reputation schemes are systems developed to collect, analyse and propagate users' reputation [12] . They can be used for many purposes, but in the last few years have emerged as a promising means for enabling electronic transactions in e-commerce. Studies have shown that use of reputation schemes has positive effects on the efficiency and honesty of markets [1] , and that the reputation of a particular agent can have positive effects on the agent's gain [13] .
Most current reputation schemes, especially the practical ones, are specifically designed for on-line use, eBay being a prime example (www.ebay.com). This situation is not surprising as a reputation scheme must provide real time responses so that users' past behaviours can be obtained immediately. Although an on-line reputation scheme is currently preferred, it suffers two main difficulties: availability and scalability. For example, in a case of denial of service it may not be possible to access the central server and so reputation values cannot be found. If the central server is distributed to overcome such problems, then synchronisation and consistency of data will become difficult.
These problems of distributed reputation systems have much in common with the problems of distribution of public keys. In both cases there is a need for access to authenticated values distributed in a timely fashion. Public keys are usually propagated through certificates formed by an off-line trusted third party. It seems a natural idea to use reputation certificates formed in an analogous way by a trusted third party. One of the main aims of this paper is to explore how this may best be achieved.
Reputation certificates may be controlled by users themselves. The certified reputation value calculated from processed feedback is communicated to the reputation owner after completion of transactions with its counterparts. Reputation Table 1 . The participants and their symbols
F T
A feedback target is the entity who is being evaluated and gains the reputation rating based on the feedback given by a feedback provider.
RP
A relying party is the entity who relies on the feedback target's reputation rating to make a decision whether to proceed in a transaction or not.
C A The certificate authority is responsible for the registration of the feedback targets as well as to issue certificates to them.
CC/RA The collection centre/reputation authority collects legitimate feedbacks and uses them to calculate reputation rating and update the feedback target's reputation certificate.
AA
The attribute authority is responsible for issuing and signing the attributes.
certificates can be obtained from reputation owners without the need to contact a central authority. There seem to be two natural ways to realize this proposal.
1. Employ existing identity certificate technologies, for example, X.509 [5] and PGP [15] to incorporate reputation values. 2. Employ a separate certificate specifically for the reputation value.
In the former option a reputation rating is regarded as one of the attributes in the identity certificate. As a result the implementation does not require any significant modification to the existing infrastructure. The latter, on the other hand, requires a special authority to manage the reputation rating scheme. We will compare the relative advantages of these different options later.
This paper proposes an off-line reputation scheme based on public key certificates. The solution is flexible enough to accommodate most formats of reputation rating. Different options are considered for how to bind the reputation information with the identity of the subject. Our proposal, which we call articulated certificates, can be applied in other situations when it is desired to augment or update certificate information without re-issuing the identity certificate.
Organisation of the paper Section 2 discusses the background of reputation schemes. Section 3 discusses three basic solutions to implement binding between identity certificates and reputation information. Section 4 describes our proposed solution, its properties and the required protocols. Section 5 discusses the relative merits with other options. Table 1 presents the notations and the symbols used throughout the paper.
Reputation Systems
There has been considerable interest in reputation systems in recent years and an extensive literature has developed [12] . Reputation systems may be roughly classified into two activities. Reputation calculation is the task of obtaining reputation values from a set of feedback information. There are various properties that may be desirable for calculation engines and reputation values may take different formats. In this paper we are not concerned with how reputation values are calculated, as long as they can be represented efficiently in a bit string. Reputation propagation is concerned with how to distribute reputation values to parties that require to use them. This is the area addressed in this paper. There are different properties that may be important, including high availability of values and reliability. A feature that has often been neglected is privacy of reputation values; we address this partially in this paper by allowing owners of reputation certificates to control their distribution.
Off-line reputation propagation has been proposed by some recent authors [4, 3] . These schemes addressed the integrity of the submitted feedbacks against manipulation but are not suited to centralised reputation calculation. A recent proposal of Liau et al. [7] (the LZBT scheme) demonstrated the possibility of using certificates to represent a user's reputation in the off-line environment. The LZBT scheme seems promising for P2P systems because no central authority is required to operate the scheme. However, its major limitation is that the relying party has to contact one or more of the preceding feedback provider to verify the validity of reputation certificates. This creates an extra burden to the service consumers to verify the certificate.
Reputation certificates
Identity certificates bind the identities of users with their public keys. The certificate is issued and signed by a trusted certificate authority CA. Identity certificates are typically long term and contain several attributes such as subject name, public key, expiry date, issuer name, and certificate holder's name. These certificates are mainly used for authentication purposes. Attribute certificates [9] , on the other hand, are mainly used to provide access controls and role permissions of an entity with regard to accessing resources. Therefore, these certificates are often employed within organizational boundaries. Attribute certificates typically do not contain the identity of an entity; instead they may contain attributes such as role, access control, expiry date, the issuer name and the issuer signature.
A reputation rating can be considered as an attribute bound to an identity. Reputation certificates therefore need to be used in conjunction with an identity certificate. There are various ways that this may be achieved. Park and Sandhu [11] discussed three techniques to bind two certificates (the identity and the attribute certificate): monolithic, autonomic and chained signatures. In the monolithic signature technique the identity and attribute certificate are combined to become a single certificate which is signed by an authority. The autonomic signature technique implements separate signatures: the identity certificate and the attribute certificate are signed by different authorities. To bind the two certificates certain attributes in the identity certificate are linked to the attribute certificate. Finally in the chained signature technique the signature of authority on the identity certificate is used as a connection link between the identity and the attribute certificates. In the next subsections we will consider solutions which correspond roughly to this classification.
Combined Certificates
In this solution the identity certificate and reputation certificate are the same object, and the reputation value is simply an additional attribute in the certificate. This corresponds to the monolithic certificate of Park and Sandhu [11] . Figure 1 depicts the abstract view of the solution. In this solution, the feedback target and the feedback provider are required to register with the authority. A reputation certificate is issued and signed by the reputation certificate authority. The reputation certificate should be verified by the relying party. The combined certificate offers several advantages; it requires no new infrastructure, is straightforward to implement and requires only one operation to verify the authority's signature. However, it has some drawbacks.
1. The reputation authority is required to issue and manage the certificates besides its routine task to calculate the reputation of the participants. 2. The reputation attribute becomes available to any party who has access to the identity certificate. Users may prefer to hold their reputation values privately except when needed for transactions. 3. Reputation certificates need to be updated frequently so the identity certificate also needs to be issued each time the reputation is updated.
A different way to form a combined certificate was the smart certificate proposed by Park and Sandhu [10] . The scheme uses the structure of the X.509 certificate as its basis and the extension fields in the original certificate are used to incorporate additional attributes. Each attribute in the certificate is managed by different authorities. Although the smart certificate has several desirable properties, a major limitation highlighted by Chadwick and Otenko [2] is that it is automatically invalid once any attribute is changed. We expect the reputation rating to change frequently and the certificate needs to be re-issued each time.
Separate Certificates
The separate certificate corresponds to the autonomic certificate of Park and Sandhu [11] . Figure 2 is a graphical representation of the solution showing the two types of certificates used. The identity certificate is issued by the certificate authority, while the reputation certificate will be issued by the reputation authority. The certificates are linked due to shared information, in particular the unique name (or X.509 distinguished name) from the identity certificate may be included in the attribute certificate. Because there are two authorities, separation of duties can be conducted which can reduce the problem of overloading the reputation authority. The reputation authority is only responsible for the calculation of the reputation, while the certificate authority is responsible for the registration of the feedback targets. The identity certificate is used as an identity mechanism for the feedback target. Like the combined certificate solution, this solution also has its limitations.
1. It is costly to match the identity certificate and the reputation certificate especially to the relying party RP who has to do three steps of verification: first to check the validity of the identity certificate; second to check the validity of the reputation certificate; third to match between these two certificates. 2. RP cannot determine whether RA is authorized to provide reputation for F T s. This means that relying parties have to independently check the policy and practice statements for any issuers of attribute certificates.
Related Certificates
The idea of related certificates is to ensure that the attribute certificate has a functional link to the identity certificate, beyond simply referring to the same identity. This corresponds to the chained certificates of Park and Sandhu [11] . The difference from the separate certificate option is that now the binding information in the attribute certificate depends on the C A signature on the identity certificate. In other words, the attribute certificate is bound to a specific instance of the identity certificate.
Using an attribute certificate related to the identity certificate as the reputation certificate is a reasonable option. However, the drawbacks already mentioned for separate certificates still apply. Independent signature checking increases the computational burden. The issue of authorization of the RA also applies here, but with a different twist. The issuer of attribute certificate is free to act independently of the C Aof the identity certificate. However, C As may object to use of their certificates by third parties for purposes without their consent and may put in place legal obstacles to prevent this.
Articulated Certificates
From the discussion in section 3 we see that each of the previous proposals for binding identity and attribute certificates has some drawbacks when used for reputation certificates, although separate certificates or related certificates could be reasonable choices. In this section we proposed a new scheme for linking reputation and identity certificates. We called this an articulated certificate. Figure 3 illustrates the view of the proposed scheme. The properties of articulated certificates are different from all the options considered in section 3.
-Articulated certificates can only be issued by entities that have been authorised to do so by the identity C A. Moreover, the authority to issue may be restricted for a specific purpose or particular time interval. -The articulated certificate can be verified using the C Apublic key aloneno separate certificate is required for the reputation authority. -The identity certificate may be used either with or without the attribute certificate.
A major feature of our proposed solution is to use the concept of delegation to allow the certification authority to give power to the reputation authority to link to the original certificate. Delegation enables RA to update reputation rating in the certificate without invalidating the certificate. The C A delegates his signing capability to RA using the proxy signature scheme. Figure 4 shows the abstract view of the proposed architecture. 
Proxy Signatures
Proxy signature schemes allow an original signer to delegate signing capability to another entity, the proxy signer. The first proxy signature scheme was introduced by Mambo et al. [8] . Subsequently a number of schemes have been proposed in the literature [14, 6] . For our purpose the scheme of Mambo et al. (MUO scheme hereafter) will be employed. However, other proxy signature schemes can also be used in our proposal. A brief review of MUO scheme follows.
System Settings: Global system parameters consist of a large prime p, a prime factor q of p − 1, and an element g ∈ Z * p of order q. Computations take place in Z * p unless indicated otherwise. Entity A denotes the original signer and B denotes the proxy signer. Assume that x A is a private key for A and the corresponding public key y A = g x A and m w is a statement about delegation which typically contains some particulars including the proxy signer identification. A one way hash function H() is used. The scheme can be divided into four phases; generation of a proxy key, verification of the proxy key, signing using the proxy key and verifying the proxy signature. A small modification is made to the original of MUO scheme to include the hash of m w .
Generation of a proxy key.
A chooses a random number, k ∈ R Z * q and computes r = g k . He proceeds to compute s P = x A H(m w ) + kr mod q and then sends (s P , r) to B securely. Verification of the proxy key. Upon receiving (s P , r), B verifies g Since MUO scheme is employed, the properties of the scheme of MUO are automatically inherited into our proposal.
1. Unforgeablity Besides C A, only RA can create a valid proxy signature.
The third parties who are not designated as a proxy signer cannot create a valid proxy key. 2. Verifiability RP can be convinced of the original signer agreement on the signed message. 3. Identifiability Anyone can determine the identity of the proxy signer from a proxy signature. 4. Undeniability Once the proxy signer creates a valid proxy signature he cannot repudiate it.
Protocol of the Scheme
The protocol consists of six phases as follows. Execution of the phases is not necessarily in sequential order, except that the delegation and registration phases have to be executed prior to the other phases. Some phases may need to be executed more than once, such as updating certificate, showing certificate and validating certificate.
-Delegation C A delegates signing capability to RA so that RA can update the certificate of F T with a new reputation rating. It is assumed that both parties C A and RA have already agreed upon the terms and conditions of delegation beforehand which are encoded in m w . To delegate, C A executes the generation phase of the MUO scheme by choosing a random number k and computes r RA = g k . This is followed by computing s RA = 
where Sig CA denotes the CA's signature and Exp denotes expiry date of the certificate, On receiving F T 's particulars, C A verifies their validity. The certificate is signed by C A using his private key x CA and is sent to F T .
Notice that it is not essential to include the identity of the reputation authorities with the identity certificate, as shown above. Instead, the RA may be identified separately to the relying party by the certificate owner. -Sending Identity Certificate F T is required to send his identity certificate to RA for the initial contact. It can then be recorded in a database maintained by RA until a new identity certificate is issued.
-Updating Reputation Certificate
To prevent unnecessary updating, statistics of activity of the feedback target may be used to determine when the reputation rating should be updated. An active user may be given a short expiry date while an inactive user has a longer one. To issue a new reputation certificate RA signs it using the proxy private key s RA . The certificate is sent to F T . A typical certificate format of the articulated certificate may be as follows.
where Sig RA is the signature of RA and ExpR denotes the expiry date of the reputation rating, -Showing Certificate Before any engagement with the intended RP , F T may be required to show his reputation certificate to RP so that his reputation can be evaluated. -Validating Reputation Rating Prior to accepting the rating in the reputation certificate, RP calculates y RA and verifies the certificate validity based on signature to the conditions in m w . If so RP accepts the reputation rating as a valid reputation rating.
Discussion
There are several advantages held by our scheme compared to other schemes.
-Only one operation is required to verify the reputation certificate, as only the RA's signature needs to be checked by the relying party while the validity of the identity certificate is verified by RA. This advantage is also shared by the basic certificate. Separate certificates and related certificates, on the other hand, require three computations to verify the validity of both certificates. -There is a separation of duties between the identity CA and reputation authority. This is generally a good security practice, and ensures that neither is overloaded with management tasks. -Our scheme implements tightly-coupled binding between the identity and reputation certificates because a single identity certificate may be mapped to multiple reputation certificates. This advantage is shared by the combined certificate while the separate certificate implements loosely-coupled solution. -Our proposal has high reusability because changes to the reputation certificate or the identity certificate cannot invalidate the reputation certificate. This is shared by the separate certificate while the basic reputation and the related certificates have low reusability because any changes invalidate them.
